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Land development is a typical one-shot decision for private investors 
due to the huge investment expense and the fear of substantial loss. In 
this paper, a private real estate investment problem is analyzed within a 
one-shot decision framework, which is used for a situation where a 
decision is made only once. The one-shot decision framework involves 
two steps. The first is to identify which state of nature should be 
focused for each alternative. The second is to evaluate alternatives by 
using the focused states of nature. In a one-shot decision framework, 
the behavior of different types of private investors, such as normal, 
active, passive and more easily satisfied ones, are examined. The 
analysis provides insights into personal real estate investment and 
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1.  Introduction  
 
There are many underutilized and vacant urban lots throughout the world, 
which are held by private investors who are interested in maximizing their 
wealth by land development. Three approaches are commonly used for 
property and land valuation (Appraisal Institute, 2001; Baum and Crosby, 
1988; Isaac, 2002). The first is the cost approach, which estimates the 
property by summing the land value and the depreciated value of any 
improvements. The second is the sales comparison approach which compares 
the characteristics of a subject property with those of comparable properties 
sold in similar transactions. This kind of method is a variation of hedonic 
regression models. The third is income approach. The discounted cash flow 
(DCF) model is one of income approaches where appraisers determine the 
most probable use of the land, appraise the property according to the use, and 
then discount the future value, such as rental rate for condominiums and 
capital gain in the real estate market, to the present. The above three 
approaches are used for the valuation of land as a site for the construction of a 
particular building at the current time. Which approach is more applicable is 
problem-specific. For example, in a situation where the purchase of real estate 
is for investment, the income approach seems more suitable, whereas for 
individual use, the sales comparison approach is more acceptable. Another 
way for the valuation of land is to consider a vacant piece of land as a 
potential site for development in the future so that it is viewed as an option for 
purchasing one of a number of different possible buildings at exercise prices 
that are equal to their respective construction costs. Real option based 
valuation methods are proposed in the literature (Titman, 1985; Williams, 
1991; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). Seiler et al. (2008) examines residential 
real estate from the viewpoint of behavioral finance theories. The real estate 
decision model is built based on the regret theory with false reference points. 
Regret aversion and false reference points are statistically tested in a 
hypothetical real estate investment with an induced false reference point. 
Some research studies focus on testing psychological effects for property 
valuation within the framework of the Prospect theory (Diaz and Hansz, 1997; 
Gallimore, 1996). Mori et al. (2009) tests the reflection hypothesis in the 
Prospect theory as a contributing factor in a borrower’s choice of mortgage 
type. 
 
Housing price is a key factor for real estate investment decision making. 
However, it is always difficult to obtain the pricing function. Kummerow 
(2002) points out the following characteristics of real estate assets. Real estate 
assets are heterogeneous. There are hundreds of factors, such as age, location, 
site/view, design/appeal, room count/gross living area, functional utility, etc., 
which might affect prices in various situations. Moreover, properties trade 
infrequently, perhaps once every 5-10 years for the average house. The 
amount of sales evidence varies widely in particular cases, but generally, there 
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none of identical properties. The inherent uncertainty in property prices are 
traditionally characterized by probability distributions (Ratcliff, 1972 and 
Squirell, 1985). However, the lack of precise information on properties often 
poses a problem. As mentioned by Bagnoli and Smith (1998), appraisers use a 
great deal of judgment to identify the characteristics (attributes) of properties 
that relate to property prices. Additionally, they usually have to consider 
qualitative characteristics, such as structural quality, architectural 
attractiveness and location convenience. In order to express the inherent 
imprecision in the ways that people think and make decisions about the 
pricing of real estate, they propose a fuzzy logic based model to obtain the 
possibility distribution (fuzzy membership function) of the property price and 
show its effectiveness. Combining fuzzy sets and artificial neural network, 
Guan et al. (2008) proposes an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system based 
approach to real estate property assessment and the real estate market in the 
midwest region of the United States is analyzed. 
 
Private real estate investment is a typical one-shot decision problem for 
personal investors due to the huge investment expense and the fear of 
substantial loss. There is only one outcome for a one-shot decision problem. 
The private real estate investment problem is analyzed within a one-shot 
decision framework. The procedure for a one-shot decision consists of two 
steps. In the first step, for each alternative, some states of nature, which are 
called focus points, are selected amongst all states of nature based on the 
attitudes of decision makers on uncertainty. In the second step, alternatives are 
evaluated based on their focus points to obtain the optimal alternative. For a 
private real estate investment problem, the state of nature is a building price in 
the future. The building price is characterized by the possibility distribution to 
reflect the degree to which the price will occur in the future. The alternative is 
a building size that is determined by a personal real estate investor. Within a 
one-shot decision framework, the housing price is selected by each building 
size as its focus point in the first step. In the second step, the optimal building 
size is obtained to maximize the satisfaction when the focus points come true. 
The behavior of different types of investors, such as normal, active, passive 
and more easily satisfied ones are examined.   
 
The purpose of this study is to examine a current land development decision 
within a one-shot decision framework. The main contributions of this study 
are as follows. A private real estate investment decision model is proposed 
within a one-shot decision framework, which is an innovative study on 
analyzing real estate investment problems from an economic viewpoint by 
using tools from the possibility theory. The analysis in this paper 
demonstrates the relation between the amount of uncertainty and the 
investment scale for different types of personal investors. The proposed model 
provides insights into personal real estate investment decisions and important 
policy implications in the regulation of urban land development. 
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some basic ideas of 
possibility. In Section 3, the one-shot decision framework is addressed. In 
Section 4, a possibilistic decision model for private real estate investment is 
proposed. Finally, concluding remarks for this research are made. 
 
 
2.  Basic Idea of Possibility 
 
Possibilities can be explained from several semantic aspects. One way to 
explain possibility is ease of achievement. Another way is plausibility; that is, 
the propensity of an event to occur, which relates to the concept of “potential 
surprise”. A third way to explain possibility is logical consistency with 
available information. Finally, possibility can be explained as preference, 
referring to the willingness of an agent to make a decision. Possibility is 
dually related to necessity in the sense that “not A” being not possible means 
that A is necessary. A semantic analysis of necessity can be done through 
reference to credibility, acceptance and fact. Possibility theory is based on two 
non- additivity measures; possibility and necessity. A detailed discussion 
about the differences between possibility theory and probability theory can be 
found in the literature (Dubois, 2006) and the very basics of possibility theory 
is introduced in Appendix A. Possibility distribution is a function whose value 
shows the degree to which an element is to occur, defined as follows: 
 




, then the 
function  (x) is called a possibility distribution where S is the sample space 
with an element x. (x) is the possibility degree of x. (x) = 1 means that it is 
normal that x occurs and  (x) = 0    means that it is abnormal that x occurs. A 
smaller possibility degree of x means more surprise for the occurrence of x. 
The following two examples are used to illustrate possibility. 
 
Example 1  How Many Eggs Will Peter Eat This Morning? 
We can predict the amount of eggs eaten by Peter from two aspects, 
probability (frequency) and possibility (capability). Assume that the sample 
space S is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. The estimation is listed in Table 1. It 
follows from Table 1 that Peter often eats one egg in the morning, sometimes 
two or three eggs from a statistical viewpoint, but eating one, two or three 
eggs is normal without any unpleasantness for him. Even if he never eats four, 
five, six or seven eggs in the morning, he can do it if he tries. It is impossible 
that he eats eight or nine eggs in the morning. 
 
Example 2    Who Is A Criminal? 
A car has been destroyed by somebody in a parking lot. After careful 
investigation, it is sure that one and only one of three suspects; A, B or C, 
must be a criminal, but the exact criminal is still unknown. Suppose that based Private Real Estate Investment Analysis        242 
 
 
on the currently obtained evidence, subjective probabilities are used to 
characterize the belief about the criminal amongst these three suspects and 
given as follows: P(A) = 0.4, P(B) = 0.4 and P(C) = 0.2. In consideration of 
the relation  ) ( 1 ) ( A P A P    where  A  is the complement of A, it can be 
concluded that there is no criminal amongst the three suspects in the context 
of probability ( ) ( ) ( A P A P  , ) ( ) ( B P B P  , ) ( ) ( C P C P  ). This conclusion 
is in conflict with the antecedent one; that is, one and only one of the three 
suspects; A, B or C, must be a criminal. This conflict originates from the 
existence of incomplete information. In this example, the possibility 
distributions that show the degrees to which a person might be a criminal are 
given as follows:  (A) = 1,  (B) = 1and  (C) = 0.7.  (A) =  (B) = 1 means 
that based on the obtained evidence, A and B have the highest possibility of 
committing a crime. The relation  ) ( 1 ) ( A π A π     implies that the 
possibility degree of A being a criminal does not provide any information on 
A not being a criminal. 
 
It follows from this example that possibility distribution is a less restricted 
framework than single probability measures and hence, can be used for 
encoding ill-known subjective probability information. From the above 
examples, it is clear that the possibility distribution can be used to represent 
the knowledge or judgment of human beings. Bagnoli and Smith (1998) 
employ the fuzzy logic based model to obtain the possibility distribution 
(fuzzy membership function) of the property price. Guo and Tanaka (2003) 
propose the methods for identifying the upper and lower possibility 
distributions from the given possibility degrees of samples via linear 
programming problems. The identified possibility distributions of the returns 
of securities are used for portfolio selection problems. 
 
Table 1  Possibilities Versus Objective Probabilities 
Eggs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Probabilities  0.6  0.3  0.1  0 0 0 0 0 0 




3.  One-Shot Decision Framework 
 
The first step in a decision analysis is the problem formulation. The set of an 
alternative a is A. The set of a state of nature x is S. The degree to which a 
state of nature is to occur in the future is characterized by a possibility 
distribution (x) defined in Definition 1. The consequence that results from 
the combination of an alternative a and a state of nature x is referred to as a 
payoff, denoted as  (x,a). The satisfaction level of a decision maker for a 
payoff can be expressed by a satisfaction function, as defined below. 243    Guo 
 
 
Definition 2. The set of a payoff   (x,a) is denoted as V. The following 
function, 
] 1 , 0 [ :  V u            (1) 
with  , for  ,                   ( 2 )   ) ( ) ( 2 1 v u v u  2 1 v v 
is called a satisfaction function. As the payoff is the function of x and a, we 
can rewrite the satisfaction function as     a x v u ,  . For the sake of 
simplification, sometimes we write      a x v u ,  as    a x u ,  in  this  paper. 
 
In a decision analysis, a decision maker has to select an alternative before the 
state of nature is known. In some cases, the selected alternative may provide a 
good or excellent result due to a favorable state of nature. In other cases, a 
relatively unfavorable state of nature may occur which causes the selected 
alternative to provide only a fair or even poor result. It is true that one and 
only one state of nature will occur for a one-shot decision problem. The 
information for a one-shot decision can be summarized as a quadruple 
 u S A , , ,   . A one- shot decision is to choose one alternative based on 
 u S A , , ,    when only one decision chance is given. The procedure for 
making a one-shot decision is divided into the following two steps (Guo, 2004, 
2009). 
 
Step 1    Decide which state of nature should be considered for each 
alternative. The following three choices are used for selecting some states of 
nature. As three choices characterize the different attitudes of decision makers 
on uncertainty, a decision maker should decide which choice will be 
employed to fit his own type in this step. 
 
Choice 1 A decision maker only focuses on the normal case so that the state 
of nature with possibility degree 1, denoted as  , is chosen, which is: 
o x
) ( max arg x π x
S x
o
  .              ( 3 )  
o x   is called a normal focus point.    is used to denote the value 





Choice 2  For an alternative a, a decision maker chooses a state of nature, 
denoted as , which is:  ) (
* a x
)) , ( ), ( min( max arg ) (
* a x u x π a x
S x  .        ( 4 )  
It follows from (4) that   makes  ) (
* a x x  )) , ( ), ( min( ) , ( a x u x π a x h   
reach the maximum.   represents the lower bound of the 
pair  . It means that the state of nature x’s possibility degree and 
satisfaction level provided by an alternative  are at least 
)) min( , ( ), ( a x u x π
)) , ( ), ( ( a x u x π
a       a x u x , , min  . Private Real Estate Investment Analysis        244 
 
 
Increasing       a x u x , , min   (       a x u x
S x
, , min max 

 ) will increase the lower 
bound of the possibility degree and satisfaction level simultaneously. 
Therefore,        a x u , x




arg ) ( * a x
 is for seeking the state of nature with 
the higher possibility degree and satisfaction level. The selected state of 
nature    is called an active focus point of the alternative a.  (
* x
 
Choice 3  For an alternative a, a decision maker chooses a state of nature, 
denoted as  , which is: 
.                ( 5 )   ( ), ( 1 max( min u x π
S x  

) ( * a x
)) ,a x
        a x u x , , 1 max     makes  It follows from (5) that  a x g , x   
reach the minimum.        a x u x , ,  1 max 
    a x u x , ,
  represents the upper bound of the 
pair  . It means that the state of nature  1   x ’s possibility degree 
is at least        a x, u x , 1 max 1     and its satisfaction level provided by an 
alternative  a i s  a t  m o s t ,        a x u , x , 1 max   . Decreasing 
 (     a x u x , ,         a x u x , , 1 max
S x
1 max min  

) will increase the lower 
bound of the possibility degree      a x, u x , 1 max 1     and decrease the 
upper bound of the satisfaction level      a x u x , , . Therefore,  1 max  




arg max  

 a x*
 is for seeking the state of nature with a higher 
possibility degree and lower satisfaction level. The selected state of nature 
  is called a passive focus point of the alternative a.  
 
Example 3  Let us consider a discrete case for private real estate investment. 
The set of states of nature    5 4 3 2 1 , , , , x x x x x S   consists of five housing 
prices per building size in the future and the set of alternatives    2 1,a a A    
includes two housing sizes. The possibility degrees of housing prices and 
satisfaction levels for the two housing sizes in each housing price are listed in 
Table 2. The private investor has only one chance to choose one building size 
from A.                 
 









  holds, we have: 
,                   ( 6 )  
4 ) ( x x π
S 
which is a normal focus point (building price 4). As x2 and x4 make 
 ( min    5 4 3 2 1 , , , , x x x x x S x   ) maximize, which is 0.7, we 
have: 
,         ( 7 )  
1)) , ( ), ( min( a x u x π
S 1
* arg ) (a x
x  max
 4 2 x x  
which are active focus points (building prices 2 and 4) of the alternative a1 245    Guo 
 
 
(building size 1). As x3 makes        1 , , 1 max a x u x    
( ) minimize, which is 0.5, we have:   5 4 3 2 1 , , , , x x x x x S x   
           
3 1 1 * )) , ( ), ( 1 max( min arg ) ( x a x u x π a x
S x   

,           ( 8 )  
which is the passive focus point (building price 3) of a1 (building size 1). Let 
us take a close look at Table 2 to understand the above results. The normal 
focus point is x4 (building price 4) because its possibility degree is 1. The 
active focus points of x1 (building size 1) are x2 and x4 (building prices 2 and 
4) which implies that (0.7, 1) and (1, 0.7) are undominated by the pairs of the 
possibility degrees and the satisfaction levels on the other states of nature 
(building prices 1, 3, 5). Both of them are the states of nature with high 
possibility degrees and satisfaction levels. The passive focus point of a1 
(building size 1) is x3 (building price 3), which is a state of nature with a high 
possibility degree and lower satisfaction level. Likewise, the active focus 
point of a2 (building size 2) is x2 (building price 2) whereas its passive focus 
point is x4 (building price 4). It can be seen that different alternatives (building 
sizes) associate with different focus points (building prices). 
 
Table 2  Information on Possibility Degrees and Satisfaction Levels 
 
1 x   2 x   3 x  
4 x   5 x  
) ( i x    0.3 0.7  0.75  1  0.6 
) ( 1 i x     0.7  0.3 0.25 0.2  0.4 
) , ( 1 a x u i   0.9 1  0.5 0.7  0.9 
) , ( 2 a x u i   0.6 0.7  0.6  0.55  1 
 
 
Step 2. Based on the different types of focus points, the optimal alternatives 
are determined as follows: 
) , ( min max arg a x u a
o
X x A a
o
o o   ,                      ( 9 )  
     ,              ( 1 0 )   ) ), ( ( max max arg
*
) ( ) (
*
* * a a x u a
a X a x A a   
) ), ( ( min max arg * ) ( ) ( *
* *
a a x u a
a X a x A a    ,          ( 1 1 )  
where X
o is the set of normal focus points, X
*(a) and X *(a) are the sets of 
active and passive focus points of an alternative a, respectively. a
o, a
* and a* 
are called normal, active and passive optimal alternatives, respectively. 
* *  and    are called optimal active and optimal passive focus points, 
respectively. 
) (a x ) ( * * a x
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It follows from (9), (10) and (11) that when determining which alternative is 
the best, only the satisfaction levels on focus points are taken into account. 
The reason is as follows: the decision maker thinks the focus points are the 
most appropriate states of nature for him/her and the decision maker chooses 
one alternative which can bring about the best consequence once the focus 
point comes true. Decision rules maximin and maximax are used in (9), (10) 
and (11) for the cases where multiple focus points exist for an alternative. 
Maximin and maximax reflect the conservative and aggressive attitudes, 
respectively. 
 
Let us go back to Example 3. We have   4 x X
o  ,     4 2 1
* , x x a X  , 
, } { ) ( 3 1 * x a X      2 2
* x a X   and    4 x 2 * a X  . When 1 a a ,   
( ) reach maximum 0.7. According to (9), we have . 
 makes  (





o  } , { 2 1 a a a 
1 a a  ) ),a ( ( max
*
) ( ) (
* * a x u
a X a x 
} 2 a , { 1 a a  ) reach maximum 1 and 
 makes  ( 2 a a  ) ),a ( ( min * ) ( ) ( * *
a x u
a X a x 
} 2 a , { 1 a a  ) reach maximum 0.55. 
According to (10) and (11), we have   and 1
* a a  2 * a a  . The optimal active 




4 2 * ) ( x a x
x
2 1
* ) ( x a x 
) ( * * a x
 , respectively. Since one and only one price in 
A will occur in the future, the private real estate investor must focus on one of 
them for making a decision. It is clear that if he makes a decision based on the 
normal case, he will choose a1 (building size 1); if he thinks that x2 (building 
price 2) will occur, then he will choose a1 ( building size 1); if he thinks that 
x4 (building price 4) will occur, then he will choose a2 (building size 2). 
 
The one-shot decision framework is enlightened by a common phenomenon: 
when you ask a person why s/he makes such a one-shot decision with little 
information, s/he will always tell you just one scenario which is crucial to 
him/her and is the basis for the obtained decision. Taking into account the 
crucial scenario for making a decision corresponds to choosing focus points 
amongst all of the states of nature with regards to plausibility and satisfaction. 
The proposed framework helps a decision maker in finding out the best 
solution in accordance to his/her attitude on plausibility and satisfaction. 
Alternatives choose their own favorable states of nature (focus points) in Step 
1 and compare consequences on the focus points with each other to obtain the 
optimal alternative in Step 2. This kind of consideration is similar to the idea 
of the data envelopment analysis (DEA), in which each decision making unit 
(DMU) selects its own favorite weights of inputs and outputs for calculating 
its own efficiency (Charnes et al., 1978; Guo and Tanaka, 2001; Guo et al., 
2000). The comparison of Choices 2 and 3 with optimistic and pessimistic 
utilities, proposed by Yager (1979) and Whalen (1984), respectively, is given 
in Appendix B. 
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4.  Possibilistic Models for Private Real Estate Investment 
 
Land development is a typical one-shot decision for private investors due to 
the huge investment expense and the fear of substantial loss. A house in this 
research is characterized by its size or the number of units, q, for 
simplification. The cost of constructing a house on a given piece of land, C, is 
a strictly increasing and convex differentiable function of the number of units 
q; that is,   
0 /  dq dC ,        (12) 
0 /
2 2  q d C d .        (13) 
The rationale for the second assumption is that as the number of floors in a 
building increases, the foundation of the building must be stronger (Titman, 
1985). The profit r that a landowner can obtain by constructing a q-size 
building is as follows: 
) ( ) , ( q C pq q p r   ,      (14) 
where p is the market price per building size at the end of construction. The 
building size that maximizes the profit of an investor will satisfy the following 
maximization problem: 
) ( max ) , ( max ) ( q C pq q p r p R
q q
   .      (15) 
In differentiating (15) with respect to q, it follows that the solution to this 
maximization problem is a building size, which satisfies the following 
condition in consideration of assumption (13): 
p dq q dC  / ) ( .        (16) 
In denoting the solution of (16) as  , the maximal profit of a landowner 
is as follows: 
) (p q

)) ( ( ) ( ) , ( max ) ( p q C p pq q p r p R
q
     .     (17) 
Theorem 1    is a strictly increasing and convex continuous function of p.  ) (p R
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
The fact that the maximal profit of an investor is a strictly increasing and 
convex continuous function of housing price implies that if a rational decision 
is made for land development, then not only the profit, but also the marginal 
profit will increase with the building price increasing. 
 
Corollary 1  The optimal building size    is a strictly increasing 








 dq . 
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Assume that the possibility distribution of the price p, denoted as , is given 
by the following unimodal continuous function: 
P π
] 1 , 0 [ ] , [ :  u l P p p π ,              ( 1 8 )  
where 0 ) (  l P p π , 0 ) (  u p πP d  c p   hat  1 ) (  an such t ] , [ u l p p  c P p π . ea  
within  ] , [ c l p p an ses within  ] , [ u c p p . p  are the lower and 
upper bounds of prices, respectively, and pc is the most possible price. 
 
P π  incr ses
l an
 follows from Corollary 1 that  should be the largest size of the 
 
emark 1  is a continuous, strictly increasing, function of p. 
om (14) that r f 
emark 2
d decrea d pu
It ) ( u p q
  
increasin
)] ( )), u p R
, , , ( u π S A
 of nature
building. As  ) , ( q p r  is a strictly  g function of the building price p, 
and a concave n of building size q, the lower bound of profit will be 
)) ( , ( ) 0 , ( u l l p q p r p r
  . Without loss of generality, suppose that the relation 
0 ) 0 , ( )) ( ( )   

l u u p r p q C  holds. Thus, the range of 
us now formalize the real 
estate in . The set of alternatives A 
is )] ( , 0 [ u p q
 . The set of the states  is [pl, pu].  P π is given by (18). 
u is a strictly increasing function of the profit r defined as 
] 1 , 0 [ )] ( )), ( ( )  





l p q p
) ( u p q

tment pr
)) ( , (

u l p q p r
profit is[ l p  
ves o
)) , ( ( q p r  
( [ : 

l q p u
( ( u p q C
 . Let 
blem by )
 S
R )) , ( ( q p r u  
It follows fr (p, q) is a continuous, strictly increasing, function o
p. As u(r(p, q)) is a strictly increasing function of r (p,  q),  u(r(p,  q)) is a 
continuous, strictly increasing function of p. 
 
R        q p r u
q , max   is a continuous strictly increasing function of p. 
As  u(r(p,  q)) is a strictly increasing function of r (p,q), we have 
rictly increasing function of p. Thus, 
 
emark 3  The normal focus point (price) is pc and the normal optimal 
         q p r u q p r u , max , max . It follows from Theorem 1 that 
ctly increasing function of p.  
  q q
) , ( max q p r
q
  is a continuous, st
  q p r u
q , max   is a continuous stri
R
alternative (building size) denoted as q
0 is the solution to (16) with
c p p  . 
 
Theorem 2         
      ( 1 9 )   ))) , ( ( max ), ( min( max ))) , ( ( ), ( min( max max q p r u p π q p r u p π
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Proof. See Appendix D. 
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points for making one-shot decisions. 
 
We can image three types of investors as follows: when making a one-shot 
ecision, the normal investor focuses on the  d
investor takes into account the scenario which can yield a higher satisfaction 
with a higher possibility; and the passive investor considers the scenario 
which can lead to a lower satisfaction with a higher possibility. 
 
It follows from Corollary 2 and (16) that the optimal active focus point 
uilding price) 
* p  satisfies:  (b
) ( )) ( ( p π q C pq u P   ,          ( 2 3 )  
p q dC dq  / ) ( ,           ( 2 4 )  
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yields the larger investment scale than the one based on the normal focus 
point; the decision based on the normal focus point leads to a larger 
investment scale than the one based on the passive focus point. The 
conclusion derived from Theorem 3 that taking a favorable view of real estate 
investment may stimulate a stronger desire for investment is quite close to 
common sense in the real world. 
 
Definition 4  Suppose that there a A π B π . 
If for allx ,  ) ( ) ( x π x π B A   holds, then B π is said more informed than
which is denoted as  A. 
 
Theorem 4  The a
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ctive optimal building sizes based on possibility 





passive optimal building sizes based on possibility distributions A and B are 
denoted as  A q*  and  B q* , respectively.  the po bility distribution B is 
more informed than the possibility distribution A; that is, A B π π  , then the 
active optim uildin ze based on the possibility distribution A is not 
smaller than the one based on possibility distribution B; tha
*
B A q , and 
the passive optimal building size based on the possibility distribution A is not 
larger than the one based on the possibility distribution B; that is, B A * *
* q
ssi
l b g si
t is,
* q 
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ribution of the buildi
ner 2 is always not larger than the 
intersection of 
considers the passive focus point. In other words, an obscure business 
prospect can stimulate the investment of active investors, but deter passive 
investors from investing. It would be helpful for regulating urban land 
development to know if the majority of investors in a real estate market are 
active or passive investors. Assume that the majority of investors are active 
ones in a particular real estate market. A clear view for the real estate market 
future from the concerned authorities would be, for example, good medicine 
for a real estate bubble, whereas a vague forecast or lack of information on the 
real situation of the real estate market would be beneficial for encouraging the 
growth of the real estate market. Likewise, we also can make an analysis for a 
real estate market where the majority of investors are passive. 
 
Definition 5  Suppose that there are two landowners; 1 and 2, and their 
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2 q q  . Similarly, it  1 * 2 * q q  . 
ans that inde r the investor is active or passive,
a more easily satisfied investor results in a smaller building siz
th
concluded that a more easily satisfied investor prefers increasingly smaller 
investment scale. Whether an investor is more easily satisfied is strongly 
related to the demographical and geographic factors of the investor. Theorem 
5 can be used to piece out the situations of the investment scale if the 
characteristic of the major investors in a particular real estate market is 
known. 
 
Remark 4  The model used for real estate investment; that is, formula (14) 
with con
w
is a complex process with many different considerations/factors in play. The 
complexity and uncertainty can be reflected by the possibility distribution of 
price. As the possibility distribution used in this paper is a unimodal 
continuous function, which is the most general function, the conclusions 
obtained in the paper have generality for characterizing investment situations 
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decision framework. Th
d
possible outcome; the active investor takes into account the scenario which 
can yield higher satisfaction with a higher possibility; the passive investor 
considers the scenario which can lead to lower satisfaction with a higher 
possibility. The active investor decides on a building size that is larger than 
the one by a normal investor, which is larger than the one determined by a 
passive investor. Increasing the uncertainty of the building price can cause an 
active investor to increase his investment scale and a passive investor to 
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satisfaction level becomes larger for the same profit. A more easily satisfied 
investor prefers an increasingly smaller investment scale. Such conclusions 
have important policy implications. For example, if the majority of investors 
are active in a particular real estate market, a clear view for the real estate 
market future from the concerned authorities would be good medicine for a 
real estate bubble, whereas a vague forecast or lack of information on the real 
situation of the real estate market would be beneficial for encouraging its 
growth. The situations of the investment scale can be pieced out based on the 
characteristic of the major investors in a particular real estate market (more 
easily satisfied or not). An analysis of a private real estate investment problem 
with possibilistic information is just the beginning. For future research, other 
kinds of focus points that reflect the different behavior of investors can be 
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Appendix A  The Basics of Possibility Theory (Dubois and Prade, 1988; 
Klir and Folger, 1988) 
 
Possibility theory is based on possibility and necessity measures which are 
defined below. 
 
Given a universal set X and its power set  , a possibility measure, Pos, is 
a function 
) (X ζ
                ,        (A-1)  ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( :  X ζ Pos
which satisfies the following axiomatic requirements: 
(1) ,  0 ) Φ (  Pos
(2) ,  1 ) Ω (  Pos
(3) For any family } ), ( | { I i X A A i i   , where  I  is  an  arbitrary index set,   
 i
I i I i








sup  . 
Given a universal set X and its power set  , a necessity measure, Nec, is 
a function 
) (X ζ
] 1 , 0 [ ) ( :  X ζ Nec ,              ( A - 2 )  
which satisfies the following axiomatic requirements: 
(1) ,  0 ) Φ (  Nec
(2) ,  1 ) Ω (  Nec
(3) For any family } ), ( | { I i X ζ A A i i   , where I is an arbitrary index set,   
 i I i
I i









inf  . 
The dual relation between possibility and necessity measures holds as: 
) ( 1 ) (
c A Pos A Nec   .                 ( A - 3 )  
Suppose that we know the fact X B  . Based on this fact, the possibility 
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Appendix B  Comparison with Optimistic and Pessimistic Utilities (Guo, 
2008, 2009) 
 
The optimistic and pessimistic utilities are defined as follows: 
)) , ( ), ( min( max ) (
* a x u x π a u
S x
 ,      (B-1) 
)) , ( ), ( 1 max( min ) ( * a x u x π a u
S x  

.     (B-2) 
(B-1) proposed by Yager (1979) and (B-2) proposed by Whalen (1984) are 
axiomatized in the style of Savage by Dubois et al. (2001) and called the 
optimistic and pessimistic utilities of an alternative a, respectively. Giang and 
Shenoy generalize these two utilities by introducing an order on a class of 
canonical lotteries (2005). 
 
The differences between the one-shot decisions based on Choices 2 and 3 and 




In (B-1) and (B-2),   is regarded as a fuzzy event.  and 
 are the possibility and necessity measures of  , respectively, 
which are used for evaluating an alternative (Whalen, 1984; Yager, 1979). 
All explanations are based on a strong commensurability assumption between 
possibility and preference. However, within a one-shot decision framework, 
the possibility degree and the satisfaction level run on their own rights. In 
other words, the possibility degree and the satisfaction level do not compare 
with each other. min(  denotes the lower bound of the pair 
, which means that the state of nature
) , ( a x u
( ), ( u x π
) (
* a u
) ( * a u
), ( ( u x π
) , ( a x u
a
)) ,a x
)) , ( a x x ’s possibility degree 
and satisfaction level provided by an alternative are at least 
. 
a
)) ), (x , ( ), x u x ( min(π a )) a , (x u 1 max(    denotes the upper bound of 
the pair  , which means that the state of nature x’s possibility 





), ( 1 ( x π 
)) ( ), x u ,a    and its satisfaction level 
provided by an alternative a  is at most,  )) max( , ( ), a x u ( 1 x   . 
      a , x u , x
S x max arg min 

 and      a x,  x ,  u
S max
x min arg 1  

 are for nothing, 
but seeking some states of nature for an alternative   i n  S t e p  1  o f  t h e  




S e t                    )) , ( ), ( min( ) , ( a x u x π a x h  .               ( B - 3 )  




)) ), ( ( )), ( ( min( )) , ( ), ( min( max ) , ( max ) ), ( (
* * * a a x u a x a x u x a x h a a x h
S x S x




Suppose that is the optimal alternative based on the optimistic utility; that 
is,  
t a
)) , ( ), ( min( max max arg a x u x π a
S x A a
t
 
 .         (B-5) 
Considering (B-4), we know: 
)) ), ( ( )), ( ( min( max arg ) ), ( ( max arg )) , ( ), ( min( max max arg
* * * a a x u a x a a x h a x u x a
A a A a S x A a
t  
   
  
(B-6) 
Recalling (4), we know: 
) ), ( ( max arg
* * a a x u a
A a
 .                  ( B - 7 )  
In a comparison of (B-6) with (B-7), it is clear that   and   are  different 
in essence. In other words,   is used to evaluate an 
alternative based on the optimal utility whereas   is used to 
evaluate an alternative within the one-shot decision framework. It follows 
from (B-6) and (B-7) that the same optimal solution can only be obtained in 
special cases where . Likewise, 
we know that the optimal alternative based on the pessimistic utility is 
different from the one obtained in essence, in accordance to Choice 3. The 









), ( ( )), ( ( min(
* * a x u a x π
)) ), ( ( )), (








Suppose the sets of alternatives and states of nature are   and 
, respectively. The possibility degrees of states of 
nature and satisfaction levels for two alternatives in each state of nature are 
listed in Table B-1. If one decision chance is given, which alternative would 
you like to choose? 
} , { 2 1 a a A 
} , , , , { 5 4 3 2 1 x x x x x S 
 
From the data shown in Table B-1, we know that the optimistic utilities of 
alternatives   and   are 0.7 and 0.7001, respectively so that   is 
selected as an optimistic optimal alternative based on optimistic utilities, 
whereas the active optimal alternative is  based on (4) and (10). Taking a 
look at the data in Table B-1, it is easy to accept that   is preferred to 
because  dominates when the states of nature are , , and ; 
and has almost the same performance as  when the state of nature is  . 
1 a
1 a






1 x 2 a 2 a 2 x 4 x 5




Table B-1  Data for Comparing Optimistic Utility with Choice 2 
 
1 x   2 x   3 x  
4 x   5 x  
) ( i x π   0.3 0.7  0.700001  0.8  1 
) , ( 1 a x u i   0.9 1  0.699999  0.7  0.6 
) , ( 2 a x u i   0.3 0.2  0.700001  0.2 0.4 
 
 
Appendix C  Proof of Theorem 1 
 
Proof.   is the implicit function obtained from  ) (p q
 0 / ) ( ) , (    p dq q dC q p f
C
1 C
)) ( ( ) ( ) ( p q C p pq p R
   
 
with  . As     is a function of class 
1; that is, a 
1-times continuously differentiable function,    is a function of class  . 
Thus,  is also a function of class  . As , 
we have: 
0 / ) (
2 2  q d q C d f
)) p
) , (  q p q
( (q C

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,      (C-1) 
which means that   is a strictly increasing function. Considering 
, and using a derivative of an implicit function, we have: 
) (p R
0 / ) (  






















q C d dp
p dq
p d
p R d ,     (C-2) 
which means that    is a convex function of p.  ) (p R
 
 
Appendix D  Proof of Theorem 2 
 
Proof. Set  ))) , ( ( ), ( min( ) , ( q p r u p q p h P   . Considering the following 
two equations: 
) , ( max max ) , ( max max q p h q p h
q p p q
 ,          ( D - 1 )  
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(19) can be easily proved. In what follows, let us consider (20).  ) ( 1 p P    is  a 
continuous decreasing function within and   is a 
continuous strictly increasing function of p. The following inequalities 
] , [ p p c l )) , ( q p ( max r u
q
1 ) ( 1 )) , ( ( max    l P l
q
p q p r u  ,             ( D - 3 )  
)) , ( ( max ) ( 1 0 q p r u p c
q
c P     ,            ( D - 4 )  
show that there is one and only one intersection of  ) ( 1 p πP   and 
 within  . The horizontal coordinate of this 
intersection is denoted as , then: 
)) , ( ( max q p r u
q
] , [ c l p p
* p
)) , ( ( max ) ( 1 * * q p r u p
q
P    .             ( D - 5 )  
) ( 1 p πP 
, [ p p p l 
 is a decreasing function within  , which means for all 
: 
] , [ * p pl
] *
) ( 1 ))) , ( ( max ), ( 1 max( * p q p r u p P
q
P      .        ( D - 6 )  
)) , ( ( max q p r u
q
  is an increasing function within  ] , [ * u p p p , which means 
for all  :  ] u p , [ * p p
)) , ( ( max ))) , ( ( max ), ( 1 max( * q p r u q p r u p
q q
P   .      (D-7) 
(D-5) makes the following hold: 
)) , ( ( max ) ( 1 ))) , ( ( max ), ( 1 max( min * * q p r u p π q p r u p π
q P q P p     .  (D-8) 
Set . It can be understood that   is also the 
horizontal coordinate of the intersection of 
)) , ( ( max arg * Δ q p r u q
q  * p
) ( 1 p πP   and . 
Similarly, because   is a continuous strictly increasing function 
of
)) , ( ( Δ q p r u
)) , ( ( Δ q p r u
p ,   satisfies  * p max( min
p ))) Δ q , ( ( ), ( p r u p π P 1 . Thus, 
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(D-9) 
In consideration of (D-9) and the following fact: 
)) , ( max ), ( max( min )) , ( ), ( max( min a x g x f a x g x f
a x x
 ,   (D-10) 
we  have  (20).     